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GERMAN POST-WAR SOCIAL POLICIES 
AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE 
BEVERIDGE PLAN. SOME OBSERVATIONS 
PREPARATORY TO A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
H.G. Hockerts 
Control Commission for Germany (British Element): Export of the 
Beveridge Plan into Occupied Germany? 
While the British social security system was fundamentally reformed 
between 1945 and 1948 on the basis of the Beveridge Plan,1 the 
German social security system was equally on the verge of a break 
in continuity and of a new beginning. In 1946/7 the Manpower Direc­
torate of the Allied Control Commission, the highest authority of the 
quadripartite administration, worked out a draft for a 'compulsory 
social insurance law for Germany' which deviated to a considerable 
degree from the traditional principles of the German social insurance 
system.2 Whereas the guiding principle in Germany had hitherto been 
to cover only the economically weak groups in need of special protec­
tion — which as a matter of principle excluded more highly paid 
employees and the self-employed — the intention now was to extend 
the insurance to all citizens (with the exception of employers with 
more than five employees). The Allied draft, just as the Beveridge 
Plan, thus aimed at a social insurance model that would encompass the 
entire nation. And while German social insurance hitherto had been 
organised according to specific groups and classes of the population, 
the idea was now, again as with the Beveridge Plan, to introduce a 
uniform organisation structured along regional lines, rather than on the 
former multitude of insurance categories3 tailored to cover specific 
population sectors, each with different contributions and benefits. 
Certain parallels to the simultaneous reforms in Britian are thus 
evident. This might lead to the assumption that it was the intention 
of the Manpower Division of the British Control Commission — CCG 
(BE) - to introduce the Beveridge Plan in Germany.4 This Manpower 
Division — in the judgement of one expert — was 'easily the best 
group of civil servants in the CCG and this was the direct result of 
Ernest Bevin's interest in its formation when he was at the Ministry 
of Labour'.5 The main criterion for recruitment was 
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that the person should already be an established civil servant in the 
Ministry of Labour. As this Ministry had a large departmental 
(i.e. executive grade mostly outside London) staff, i t was possible 
to recruit able and reliable people who knew that their work in 
Germany, i f good, would stand to their credit on their return to the 
United Kingdom.6 
The first issue of the 'Arbeitsblatt für die Britische Zone' — which was 
controlled by the Manpower Division — opened with a report on the 
Beveridge Plan.1 In a later issue, the Director of the Division's Social 
Insurance Branch gave an account of the British reform Acts. 8 In 1946 
Lord Beveridge himself toured the British sector of occupied Germany 
and delivered lectures on the British reform programme in several 
German cities.9 
Does this indicate that there existed some sort of missionary zeal 
with regard to social policy on the part of the British occupation 
forces? Indeed not. The British Manpower Division came to Germany 
with the directive to preserve as far as possible the traditional German 
social security system.10 The driving force behind the reform planning 
in the quadripartite Manpower Directorate was not the British, but 
the Russians and Americans, who both had German advisers steeped 
in the tradition of socialist and trade union demands for reform. The 
draft for a reform Bill, on the other hand, which the British submitted 
for deliberation by the Manpower Directorate, was a verbatim trans­
lation of a paper written by a former civil servant in the German 
Ministry of Labour. 
Although exaggerating a little, one could say that the British Man­
power Division always thought in financial terms at first: it wanted 
to cut costs and save money. That thrift was the aim can be illustrated 
by a number of examples, for example the fact that social insurance 
benefits in the British-occupied sectors were scaled down much more 
than in, say, the American one. During the deliberations on the Allied 
draft for reform, the British argued successfully in favour of lowering 
the established German benefit levels. In this way they intended to 
ensure that social insurance could be financed entirely without state 
funds. While the Beveridge Plan envisaged large public subsidies for 
social insurance, the British occupation forces in Germany (who were 
not alone in this, however) strove for total absence of subsidies from 
public funds and the Allied draft reform law accordingly envisaged 
a social insurance system financed exclusively out of contributions.1 1 
The consideration of economy was equally overriding for the British 
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assent to the streamlined organisational structure and the extension 
of insurance to wider sections of the population, which the Allied 
draft legislation envisaged. The one seemed a suitable method of 
cutting costs, the other would bring in more contributions and was 
thus desirable in order to compensate in some measure for the absence 
of state subsidies. This British policy of economy must be seen against 
the background of a worsening economic situation at home: to lower 
the costs of German social insurance would help towards making 
occupied Germany self-sufficient and thus relieve the British taxpayer 
of the responsibility of subsidising vital German imports. 
German Opposition 
The Allied draft legislation conflicted with the manifold interests 
of wide sections of the middle class, who particularly protested against 
the proposed extension of compulsory insurance and the streamlining 
of the organisation. This opposition movement was led by the private 
insurance companies, the medical profession, artisan and agricultural 
organisations, industrialists, white-collar workers and traditional insur­
ance funds, whose existence was threatened by this reform. Sections 
within the German trade union movement also rejected the draft, 
albeit for different reasons, and most emphatic among them was the 
Federation of Trade Unions in the British sector.12 Its protest was 
directed against the inadequacy of the proposed benefits and the 
envisaged abolition of all fixed subsidies from public funds. 
The German opposition to the draft received ideological reinforce­
ment from anti-Nazi arguments. The National Socialist 'Deutsche 
Arbeitsfront' had also endeavoured to include all citizens in a uni­
formly organised system of social security, although, because of the 
war, no serious attempt to put this into practice had ever been made.13 
But the existence of such plans had been public knowledge and one 
may imagine with horror how their realisation would have transformed 
the institutions of social security into instruments of political subjuga­
tion. In a counter-move, some members of the German opposition to 
Hitler had demanded the retention of the traditional German social 
security system.14 Now, after 1945, this passionate rejection of Nazi 
tendencies towards centralisation and collectivism was transferred, 
partly out of conviction, partly for tactical reasons, to the Allied 
reform programme.15 A comparison of the German and British develop­
ment thus shows up one important difference: in Britain the war 
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experience had engendered a sense of national solidarity and confi­
dence in state intervention and had thus prepared the ground for the 
Beveridge reforms; in Germany, by contrast, the experience of Nazi 
misuse of power had provoked opposition to any form of government-
imposed centralisation or collectivism. 
In another respect, too, the points of departure in Germany and 
Britain were quite different: in Britain the reform of the social security 
system was seen as a national task, while in Germany it threatened to 
take on the guise of an imposition by the occupation forces. This, 
from the outset, provoked opposition, especially because of a wide­
spread consciousness that Germany, ever since Bismarck, had been 
the leading nation in matters of social policy. That reform should 
now be dictated by the occupying forces was therefore resented all 
the more keenly. These sensitivities were further exacerbated by the 
circumstance that the tradition of social policy was virtually the only 
one with which Germany, defeated in war and deformed by National 
Socialism, could still identify, which it could refer to and be 'proud' 
of. It was no accident that Adenauer, in a mass rally of the Christian 
Democrat Union in August 1946, said emphatically: 
We must hold on to this social insurance. We are proud of it . And 
as for the proposals Beveridge has recently made in Hamburg, I 
can only say that we Germans have already had such things these 
past thirty years.16 
The Social Democrat camp was no less emphatic in its opinion 'that 
social insurance, which was created seventy years ago through German 
initiative, ought to be reformed now too by German authorities'.17 In 
addition there existed, particularly in the minds of leading trade unionists 
in the British sector, a tactical consideration: it was not inconceivable that 
the new system of social insurance, which the Allied Control Commis­
sion intended to implement, would, in view of Germany's ruined 
economy, soon run into serious financial difficulties, and they feared 
that this might bring sound principles of reform into lasting disrepute 
and thus offer a dangerous handle for nationalist agitation.1 8 
The Failure of Allied Reform Plans 
In January 1947 the Allied draft Bill was ratified (in a modified form) 
in the Russian sector. The three Western Allies, however, did not take 
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the parallel step. In July 1947 the Allied Manpower Directorate had 
reached agreement on virtually all points of the draft (the only question 
to remain a matter of controversy was whether civil servants should be in­
cluded or not); yet early in 1948 the draft legislation failed to pass the 
Allied Control Council. The American and British military governors, 
Lucius D. Clay and Brian H. Robertson, declined to give their assent. An 
examination of the reasons for this failure leads to three conclusions 
which, from the angle of a particular field of research, supplement and 
modify historiographical attempts to formulate a paradigm of Anglo-
American policies during the period of occupation. 
(1) As far as the reform of the social insurance system was con-
concerned, the frequently employed historical paradigm that 
'the British were prevented by the Americans from introducing 
reforms' does not apply.1 9 The British withdrawal from the 
Allied reform project was due to growing doubts within the 
British military government. A letter which the Social Insur­
ance Branch of the British Manpower Division wrote to the 
Finance Division in February 1948 may be regarded as sympto­
matic: 
Ί η short, i t has to be admitted that we have unfortunately been 
manoeuvred into a false position on agreeing to the reform of 
social insurance in the quadripartite machine and shall be grate­
ful for anything you can do to frustrate or delay the course of 
this highly controversial measure in the Finance Directorate'.2 0 
(2) The Cold War changed the framework of the reform project: 
to the degree that the East-West conflict escalated and the 
creation of a West German state thus assumed political priority, 
it became more important for the Western powers to come to 
an understanding with the prevailing West German views than 
to reach an accord with the Soviet Union, which could only be 
achieved on the basis of the quadripartite draft law. 
(3) The historical paradigm of a 'prevented new order', according 
to which the American occupation forces and the German 
bourgeoisie, in a tacit coalition of capitalist interests, prevented 
progressive reforms 2 1 does not apply to the social insurance 
policies. In this area, the German opposition gained in effective­
ness and strength precisely because it had the support of impor­
tant sections of the trade unions. 
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The Frankfurt Economic Council: the Postponement of Decisions on 
Principle (1948/9) 
In the context of the currency reform, the British and American 
military governments in June 1949 transferred the matter of social 
insurance reform into German hands. This brought the bipartite Eco­
nomic Council, i.e. the German legislative body in the American and 
British sectors of occupation, into play. The Economic Council's 
Sozialversicherungs-Anpassungsgesetz (SVAG) raised the benefits 
considerably beyond the level envisaged in the Allied draft law, but 
dispensed with a structural reform of social insurance, since such 
fundamental decisions were to be reserved to the parliament of the 
new West German state which was about to come into being. An 
increase in benefits was indeed a priority, since those sections of the 
population who depended on such payments, especially the pensioners, 
had sunk into deep poverty: i f one takes the cost of living index of 
1938 as 100, this had gone up by 73 points by the end of 1948, while 
the average old age pension for workers had only risen by 35 points. 2 2 
German resentment was thus all the greater when in December 
1948 the bipartite Control Office of the Anglo-American military 
governments prevented the SVAG from taking effect. For a further 
year the pensioners had to suffer the effects of the surge in inflation 
which followed the currency reform and the liberalisation of the 
economy, without receiving any compensatory allowances. 
The First Bundestag (1949-53): Specific Post-war Problems and the 
Reconstruction of the Traditional Social Insurance System 
The Social Democrat Party (SPD), which inclined towards the model 
of the British welfare state, was in opposition for the duration of the 
first Bundestag (and until 1966). The Christian Democrat Union 
(CDU), the leading party in government — in coalition with the liberal 
Free Democrats (FDP) and the conservative German Party (DP) - had 
nailed the defence of the traditional German social insurance system 
to its mast. I t was of course not social insurance on which the social 
policies of the first German Bundestag were focused, but on the 
management of the specific problems brought about by the war. The 
Lastenausgleichsgesetz (Equalisation of Burdens Act) of 1952 set in 
motion a programme of massive redistribution that was to benefit 
more than 10 million refugees and people who had been bombed out. 
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Several Acts were passed to look after the 4 million people who had 
been invalided, widowed or orphaned by the war. As about a third of 
the necessary housing was lacking, a building programme with massive 
subsidies from public funds was initiated, the efficiency of which, 
incidentally, greatly impressed Lord Beveridge.23 As far as social insur­
ance was concerned, the traditional structures were - almost — com­
pletely reinstated. While the German Trade Union Federation and the 
SPD aimed at a standardised insurance structure as a matter of princi­
ple, the parliamentary majority re-established the traditional diversity 
of insurance funds. I t should be noted in this connection that leading 
officials of these institutions held important positions in all three 
governing coalition parties. Yet even the SPD agreed to splitting super­
annuation insurance into two, one for workers, the other for white-
collar employees, and shortly before the parliamentary elections of 
1953, the Bundestag voted unanimously for the reintroduction of a 
special Bundesversicherungsanstalt far Angestellte (a federal institution 
for the insurance of white-collar employees). The only explanation 
for the SPD's consent must be the fact that a few months earlier, 
during elections to the self-governing bodies of the social insurance 
system, an overwhelming majority of employees had voted for elec­
toral lists advocating a separate insurance for white-collar workers. 
This result so clearly demonstrated the wishes of sought-after voters 
that in a parliamentary election year no party dared to vote against 
hiving off once more the insurance for white-collar employees. Des­
pite the existence of the two separate institutions, in 1957 uniform 
norms of contributions and benefits for both insurance branches were 
established. 
The Position in 1953: a Need for Comprehensive Reform? 
At the end of the first legislative period in 1953, the rate of social 
expenditure in the Federal Republic (defined as the share in the net 
national product at factor costs) stood at 19.4 per cent and was thus 
higher than in all other comparable countries. In the same year the 
figure for Britain was 12.5 per cent and for Sweden 13.5 per cent. 2 4 
The high German rate reflects the ratio between a large number of 
beneficiaries — due to the war - and a comparatively low national 
product and was thus not the result of a particularly high level of 
social benefits; on the contrary: no one denied that many of the 
benefits were inadequate and that considerable lacunae also existed. 
322 German Post-war Social Policies 
So i t had been hoped in vain that the first Bundestag would introduce 
a system of family allowances. No one denied, moreover, that the 
system of social security was very fragmented, badly co-ordinated and 
to most people quite incomprehensible. With a certain time-lag 
attempts were therefore made in 1952/3 to institute comprehensive 
reforms and in this the example of the Beveridge Plan exercised — 
positively and negatively — considerable influence. This will be illus­
trated in the next three sections. 
British Impulses for Academic Discussion in Germany 
The Beveridge Plan and the British reforms based on it received very 
careful attention in Germany. In this connection a study visit to 
London by 19 German experts in January 1953 was indicative. Some 
of them were scholars (Prof. Hans Achinger, Prof. Gerhard Macken-
roth), others worked in the field (the chairmen both of the social 
policy committee of the SPD, Prof. Ludwig Preller, and of the CDU, 
Heinrich Lünendonk). For two weeks they conferred with leading 
British experts (such as Christine Cockburn, Richard M. Titmuss and 
Alan T. Peacock)25 and while they did not hesitate to criticise the 
British system,26 most of them seem to have been 'impressed by its 
uniformity, clarity and its basic conception' 2 7 
Some of the British concepts had an immediate effect on German 
scientific discussion. This was particularly true of the willingness 
to work towards a systematically and comprehensively conceived 
plan for reform, and to regard economic, financial and social policies 
as one conceptual entity. It is thus no accident that the first German 
'models for a social plan' came from authors who had observed the 
British development with particular involvement.28 Alan T. Peacock's 
analysis of redistribution2 9 provided the direct impulse for Hartmut 
Hen sen's pioneer work in Germany, Die Finanzen der sozialen 
Sicherung im Kreislauf der Wirtschaft {The Finances of Social Security 
in the Economic Cycle).20 Significant, too, was how readily during the 
1950s English terms such as 'prevention' and 'rehabilitation' were 
received into the German vocabulary. Preventive health care and 
measures for the reintegration of the physically handicapped into the 
work process had not been unknown to the German social security 
tradition but the fact that this aspect was stressed in German discus­
sions after the war much more than before has largely been due to the 
British model. 
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Out of a great number of possible examples of the close links 
between British and German discussions, I just want to mention one 
more: under the influence of Beveridge and Keynes the German dogma 
that the long-term funding of superannuation insurance requires large 
capital reserves was severely shaken. Beveridge, on the contrary, had 
emphasised that 'a state with the power to compel successive genera­
tions of subjects to insure themselves, and to levy taxes, is freed from 
the obligation to accumulate reserves for statistical purposes.'31 Gerhard 
Mackenroth, in his now famous lecture of 1952, took up this 
thought, 3 2 and it was against this background that in 1955 Wilfrid 
Schreiber formulated the concept of the 'contract between genera­
tions': in order to fund the payment of social provisions, the genera­
tion in work at any given moment cedes certain of its rights to con­
sumption to those not yet or no longer working; whereas the accumula­
tion of large capital reserves to cover such entitlements made no sense 
in terms of the national economy: i f one were to run down such 
reserves in times of crisis, this would merely have an aggravating, pro-
cyclical effect. In a crisis, Schreiber went on with Keynesian arguments, 
help could only come from the state's responsibility 'to provide sub­
sidies through an autonomous creation of purchasing power, in order 
to compensate for the crisis-induced decrease in contributions.'3 3 The 
turn away from the principle of funding pensions out of capital re­
serves, and towards the idea of covering them by transfer payments 
instead, was an important pre-condition for the great Pensions Re­
form Act of 1957, which I shall return to below. 
SPD: Reform Planning in Approximation to the Beveridge Plan 
The SPD was considerably influenced by the Beveridge Plan and this 
was in no small measure due to the great efforts by Walter Auerbach. A 
Social Democrat emigrant, Auerbach had worked from 1939 to 1946 
in the London Secretariat of the International Transport Federation 
and had taken an indirect part in the preparation of the Beveridge 
Plan.3* From 1946 to 1948 he was Vice-President of the Zentralamt 
für Arbeit (Central Labour Office) in the British-occupied sector 
and has since been one of the leading influences in the social policy 
committee of the SPD party executive. 
On his initiative the SPD in 1952 put forward a motion in the 
Bundestag — without success — to appoint a 'kind of German Beveridge 
Committee', in order to prepare a comprehensive programme of social 
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reform. 3 5 He also had an important hand in preparing a plan for reform 
within the party. The first interim result of this work was published by 
the SPD party executive under the title Basic Principles for an Overall 
Social Plan of the SPD.36 I t was a very brief document which merely 
outlined certain ground rules, but it contained certain significant paral­
lels to the Beveridge Plan. Some of the tendencies common to both will 
be briefly sketched. I t must be noted, though, that the Social Democrat 
plans for reform were not influenced by the British model alone. The 
Swedish example as well as the general stage of discussion within the 
International Labour Organisation played an important part too. Of 
particular significance were the results arrived at during the Inter­
national Labour Conference of 1944 in Philadelphia, which in turn 
had largely been based on the recommendations contained in the 
Beveridge Report. 
The functions which the Beveridge Plan envisaged for social insur­
ance — i.e. the abolition of poverty by ensuring an income in case of 
unemployment, illness, accident, old age or the death of the bread­
winner — was by no means a novelty in German eyes. What was new, 
at least in this systematic and theoretically well conceived form, was 
the recognition that social insurance can only successfully fulfil its 
function of alleviating poverty i f three pre-conditions are met: (1) 
avoidance of mass unemployment through economic policies aimed at 
full employment; (2) comprehensive health care and a service for 
work rehabilitation; (3) family allowances. 
The SPD plan recognised these three pre-conditions. (1) Just as 
the Beveridge Report had done, the Social Democrat authors of this 
plan also emphasised that social security cannot be divorced from a 
policy of full employment and that, conversely, full employment 
would only be possible with an effective social security system. Here 
the authors were thinking particularly of the productive effect of 
safeguarding health and the capacity to work, and of the stabilising 
effects certain monetary benefits would have on the economic cycle. 
(2) Just as with Beveridge, the Social Democrat authors also envisaged 
the establishment of a kind of 'National Health Service' which would 
integrate all health care services and benefits and be financed largely 
out of taxes.37 Yet in contrast to the British plan, and following the 
German tradition, they laid great stress on the principle of a decentral­
ised, participative administration. (3) Just like Beveridge, the SPD also 
demanded child allowances for each second and subsequent child, 
payable out of public funds. 
As far as the cash benefits of social insurance were concerned, 
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the SPD favoured a uniform, non-contributory, tax-financed basic 
pension for every citizen either permanently disabled or of pensionable 
age. This corresponded to Beveridge's concept of a 'flat-rate national 
minimum* for every disabled or pensionable citizen. But unlike Bever­
idge, the SPD further envisaged additional earnings-related pensions, 
financed through contributions from wages. This more markedly 
individualistic principle was deeply rooted in the German social in­
surance tradition, whereas in Britain the basic National Insurance Act 
of 1912 had already followed the principle of flat rates for both pen­
sions and contributions. 
The SPD plan deviated from the traditional German social security 
system in that it aimed at including all citizens, and at shifting the 
emphasis on finance through taxes instead of contributions. Coupled 
with a demand for a reform of the tax system (less indirect and more 
direct progressive taxation) this shift — just as in Britain — was to 
achieve greater vertical redistribution. The SPD, again like Beveridge, 
nevertheless respected the principle of encouraging achievement and 
individual initiative. ' In establishing a national minimum, it should 
leave room and encouragement for voluntary action by each indi­
vidual to provide more than that minimum for himself and his family,' 
Beveridge had written. 3 8 Similar views came from the SPD: the citizen 
was to receive only 'certain basic rates more or less as of right', since 
in this way 'the interest of the individual to look after his own security 
and his active participation would be aroused and encouraged.'39 
The Federal Government: Reform Planning Independent of the 
Beveridge Plan 
I f one leaves out of account certain not unimportant internal differ­
ences, the position of the leading government party after 1949 can 
be summed up as follows: the CDU, much more than the SPD, stressed 
the need for private initiative, for incentives and the individual's 
responsibility for his own security,40 and therefore sought to limit 
more narrowly the extent of government intervention. In its first party 
programmes it rejected the idea of extending compulsory insurance 
to the self-employed and employees in higher wage brackets. I t empha­
sised the importance of financing social insurance as far as possible 
through contributions for specific purposes (insurance principle) 
and less through taxes (state maintenance principle). This aimed at 
correlating as closely as possible personal (earnings-related) contribu-
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tions to (equally earnings-related) insurance benefits and thus at bring­
ing the distributive mechanisms of the market to bear on the benefit 
structure of social insurance. Seen in this light, social benefits are not 
purely and simply an attribute of citizenship, but the equivalent of 
individual contributions made. The guarantee of a minimum income 
for all, in this conception, is only envisaged in the form of means-tested 
public assistance, with the possible associated stigma of personal 
failure. The fact that Christian Democrats in the fifties treated the term 
'welfare state' either with scepticism, or rejected it altogether, is a 
consequence of this bias in their programme. 
I t must be said, though, that between 1953 and 1955 the Federal 
government - to whom the CDU largely ceded the initiative in this 
matter — made serious attempts to work out a comprehensive plan 
for the reform of the social security system. Chancellor Adenauer 
in particular was for a time greatly interested in such a plan, which 
would 'not superimpose the thousandth or elevenhundredth amend­
ment to Bismarck's laws', but represent 'a thorough overhaul of social 
legislation to meet modem needs'.41 In order to achieve this, he wanted 
to see the appointment of a government commission, under the chair­
manship of an independent academic or an elder statesman; to justify 
this - for Germany - unusual step he referred to the British practice 
of appointing Royal Commissions 4 2 After two years of internal govern­
ment wrangles, with endless inter-departmental rivalries and conflicts 
as to aims, the project got stuck and no commission was ever set up. 
In his search for an alternative, Adenauer took the initiative himself 
and asked four social scientists whom he trusted to work out 'a com­
prehensive concept for a reorganisation of the social security system'. 
The result of this endeavour was published in 1955 and has since 
become known as the 'Rothenfels Memorandum' [Rothenfelser Denk-
schrift).43 
This memorandum is particularly interesting in that it illustrates 
the evolution of socio-political thinking in Germany. It took for 
granted that companies, in a capitalist economic system, generate 
more costs than they contribute, as they do not have to pay for large 
portions of the 'social costs'. While the welfare state may be said to 
nationalise these externalised costs, the Rothenfels Memorandum now 
argued that those who create them should also pay for them, i.e. the 
companies themselves. Organised into federations, the employers 
were to compensate the loss of income in case of accident, illness, 
rehabilitation and seasonal unemployment. In some ways this meant 
the resuscitation of certain elements of pre-industrial workers' legisla-
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tion (which placed the onus for the care of workers on employers). 
Not only were the employers to be responsible for direct labour costs, 
but for most of the reproduction costs of labour as well. 
The memorandum sought to inject a whole hierarchy of social 
agencies (family, firm, insurance funds) between state and individual 
and to allocate many of the social security functions to the lower 
levels, in order to ensure a correspondingly strict limitation of costs 
payable by the state. The liberal principle of limiting state intervention 
and Catholic sociology's 'subsidiary principle' ('Subsidiaritätsprin-
zip') — according to which the larger social units, especially the state, 
ought to take over only those functions which lesser social units cannot 
perform equally well — formed the background for this concept. 
The memorandum did, however, argue that it was the state's 
responsibility to create the pre-conditions which would allow the 
individual and the smaller social units to develop their resources effec­
tively and fully. I t was, for instance, to be the state's role to ensure 
'a normal degree of chances of development' for all young people, 
to compensate for differences between town and country, and to 
ensure for all those able to work also 'the right to work', through 
appropriate economic and employment policies. I t was also recognised 
that social benefits cannot be considered merely as a burden on the 
economy, but must be seen as a 'pre-condition for the productive 
employment of resources'. I t is thus not possible to define the memor­
andum as being 'for' or 'against' the welfare state, since it links a num­
ber of heterogeneous conceptual elements. 
Although the concrete proposals for reform contained in the Rothen­
fels Memorandum were by and large not put into practice, the attempt 
to design an alternative to the British welfare state model was quite 
characteristic of the prevailing thinking within the CDU. This is most 
clearly illustrated by the example of the Child Allowance Law of 1954, 
the first step in German post-war child allowance legislation. These 
allowances — even in international comparison — represented the latest 
form of benefits within the social security system. Internationally 
its take-off point must be dated as late as the Second World War or 
immediately after. I t did not have its roots in the traditional 'workers' 
problem', for it is not concerned with a particular section of society, 
but with questions that touch all of modern society; yet their nature 
is such that the traditional German 'insurance principle', for technical 
reasons, i f for no others, hardly provides an adequate instrument. 
It thus seemed reasonable to place the responsibility for this pro­
vision on the state and to finance i t out of general taxes. (SPD and 
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Beveridge both made the same demand.) But it was precisely this which 
the CDU rejected. I t transferred this responsibility to the employers 
who, in order to finance it (the employers' contribution was fixed at 
a certain percentage of the total payroll), had to create special insur­
ance funds (Ausgleichskassen); each professional branch, meanwhile, 
was to pay for the cost of child allowances for its members out of its 
own funds. The CDU pushed this arrangement through, against the 
opposition of both SPD and its own coalition partners, and against 
many sceptical voices from among employers. All that has come to 
light so far indicates that the CDU did not arrive at this decision under 
pressure from interest groups, but for reasons of principle, especially 
because of its adherence to the 'subsidiary principle'. 4 4 
Dynamische Rente (1957) v. Flat-rate Subsistence Pension: was the 
Beveridge Plan Overtaken? 
While a comprehensively conceived reform of social insurance did 
not get off the ground during the Adenauer era, certain important 
partial reforms did come about. The most important of these was 
the structural reform of the compulsory superannuation system in 
1957. In this reform three separate aspects must be distinguished. 
(1) The levels of the then paid pensions were raised by about 
60 per cent 4 5 For the pensioners at the time, who had until 
then lived in the shadow of economic revival, this meant an 
instance of overdue justice: a belated compensation, facili­
tated by the boom, for their enforced renunciation of con­
sumption, whereby they had contributed to the national 
economy's creation of capital after 1948/9. 
(2) More important in the long term was the attempt to find a 
fundamental solution to the traditional problem of the dis­
crepancy between the benefits provided by a statically con­
ceived social insurance — based on the premiss of wages and 
prices remaining stable over a long period - on the one hand, 
and a rapid rise in production, wages and prices on the other. 
This was resolved by introducing 'dynamic' pensions. This 
represented an innovation in two respects: the initial pension 
rate was now arrived at by not only taking into account all 
contributions paid throughout a working life, which may have 
been overtaken by movements in prices and wages since, but 
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by computing them at current gross wage levels; and secondly, 
the stipulation of an annual adjustment of pensions payable, 
without clearly defining the points of reference by law, but 
which in practice so far (until 1978) has meant their being 
related to gross wages. In other words the guiding principle 
was to be that the earnings of workers still engaged in the 
production process and the pensions of those who have retired 
from it should develop on parallel lines, and that workers 
should participate in economic growth not only during their 
working life (by way of wages), but in retirement (by way 
of pensions) as well. 
(3) In addition, the fundamental decision was taken to establish 
a relation between workers' pensions and former earnings: 
the pension was to be of a level which would ensure that the 
standard of living earned by work should be maintained in 
old age. Retirement from work was no longer to lead to a 
sudden reduction in living standards; on the contrary, the 
'wages replacement function' of pensions was designed to 
ensure that in retirement the individual's position within the 
social structure corresponds to that of his former working 
l i f e . 4 6 To give a quantitative example: a person who has been 
insured for forty years and has always earned the average 
wage of all insured receives a (net) pension of 60 per cent of the 
current (gross) average wages of those working and insured.47 
This reform must thus be seen as an attempt once and for all to achieve 
a break with the traditional cycle of old age and poverty. Opinion 
polls at the time showed that the response was overwhelming. The 
Allensbach Institut für Demoskopie summed it up as follows: 'To 
our knowledge there has been no other case where a measure, an 
institution or even the constitution and symbols of state have evoked 
as positive an echo as this pension reform.' 4 8 The reform not only had 
a material and socio-psychological effect on recipients of superannua­
tion, disability and widows' pensions, but also on the attitudes and 
expectations of those still working, since it promised to prolong the 
benefits of economic growth into the retirement period and to pro­
vide more equitable norms for the distribution of the national product 
between generations. The pension reform of 1957 thus had a strength­
ening and consolidating effect on the young Federal Republic that 
cannot be overestimated. 
I t must be stressed, though, that while the new pension system 
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did effect a marked horizontal redistribution (the working generation, 
by way of high contributions, ceding a relatively large portion of 
its claim to consumption to the generation in retirement), it had 
little effect on vertical redistribution.4 9 Pension insurance was now 
even more strictly oriented on the principle of a direct correlation 
between individual earnings-related contributions and the size of the 
pension. I t thus projected the differentiation of earnings, and with 
it the distributive effects of market mechanisms, into pensions as well. 
I t was consequently a non-levelling system, but one which put a 
premium on achievement and maintained individual status. 
The situation of pensioners in Britain at the same time was highly 
unsatisfactory. Roughly 25 per cent of pensioners depended on (means-
tested) supplementary benefits.50 (Even before the pension reform only 
2-3 per cent in Germany had depended on supplementary public assis­
tance.51) The flat rate barely covered the minimum subsistence level. 
In addition it created — for all its egalitarian appearance — great in­
equalities of income: (a) between recipients of low pensions and those 
still at work, and (b) between that third of the British work-force 
employed by companies which provided private occupational pension 
schemes (three-quarters of such benefits not being financed by the 
companies, but through tax concessions, in other words by the tax­
payers at large52) and those less fortunate who depended solely on a 
small state pension.53 
The low level of the flat rate was no accident, for a system of 
a uniform pension for all citizens can 'for financial reasons, but also 
for reasons of work ethics, only envisage relatively small benefits, 
which will just maintain a bare subsistence level, but not a well-earned 
standard of living' . 5 4 To that extent the - apparently — egalitarian 
flat rate left a lot of room for — differentiating — private insurance 
business, and it is interesting in this connection that in 1956/7 the 
private insurance companies in Germany argued in favour of intro­
ducing a minimum flat-rate state pension for all citizens,55 while the 
SPD had meanwhile abandoned this demand. At the back of it there 
must certainly have been the thought that 'dynamic pensions', with 
the function of replacing wages, would leave much less scope for private 
insurance business than a flat-rate system; the latter would greatly 
enhance an interest in securing additional private benefits and thus, 
despite its roots in British and Swedish welfare-state concepts, be 
far less of a welfare-state measure than the reform prepared by the 
Bundestag. 
'The Flat-Rate Subsistence Pension — a Fading Hope' was how 
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the Labour Party summed it up in 1957. Indeed, the central concept 
of the Beveridge Plan - the abolition of poverty through a guaranteed 
minimum income for all - had been overtaken by history,through the 
concepts of the new German pension system, i.e. the preservation of 
the relative social status. The former had fitted an impoverished war 
and post-war economy, but the new scheme was commensurate with 
a prospering industrial society.57 I t appears almost symbolic that in 
the general Bundestag elections of 1957, the German pensioners helped 
to secure the triumphal return of the governing party, while in the 
same year British pensioners mounted a protest march through the 
streets of London. 5 8 Whereas in 1953 German experts had visited 
London to study the British system, it could be reported in 1957 
that 'the English are studying the German pension reform.' 5 9 
Taking some cues from the German system — although it would 
be erroneous to assume a simple and direct causal connection — the 
British National Insurance Act of 1959 amended the concept of a 
minimum flat rate: i t introduced a supplementary, earnings-related 
pension system, which took effect in 1961. Conversely, the 'dynamic 
pension' concept in Germany was amended in 1972 by the introduc­
tion of a sort of 'minimum ceiling': since then the pension has been 
calculated äs i f the recipient throughout his working life had always 
received at least 75 per cent of the average earnings of all the insured. 
Thus, in the longer term, one can observe a certain convergence of the 
two, initially extremely different, superannuation systems: the British 
now includes elements of earnings-related differentiation, while in the 
German scheme the links with individual earnings have been loosened, 
in order to guarantee adequate minimum security for all insured 
persons. 
The Federal Republic in the Adenauer Era: an Unwilling Welfare 
State? 
When the Labour Party took office in 1945 it was with the declared 
aim of turning Britain into a welfare state (and when the Conservatives 
returned to power they did at least not reverse the reforms of 1945/8). 
The leading government party in the Adenauer era (1949-63), by 
contrast, had an a priori sceptical attitude towards any increase in 
state intervention in order to promote a welfare state. ' In spite of its 
neo-liberal leanings', as Gaston V . Rimlinger so accurately put i t , 
the Federal Republic at the end of the Adenauer era 'was in reality 
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an advanced welfare state'. For corroboration, Rimlinger refers to 
'the nearly universal coverage of employed persons and the relatively 
high levels of contributions and pensions'.60 The fact particularly 
worth mentioning in this context is that all German workers, in case 
of illness, have been entitled to 90 per cent since 1957, and 100 per 
cent since 1961, of their net earnings for the first six weeks. (The 
Beveridge Plan and the National Insurance Act of 1946 also envisaged 
a flat rate for sick pay, which was supplemented in 1966 by a system 
of earnings-related additions.) In 1963 public social expenditure stood 
at 17.1 per cent of GNP in Germany, 13.8 per cent in Sweden and 
11.8 per cent in Britain. 6 1 In Germany, at the end of the 1950s, 
between 12 and 13 per cent of average earnings were deducted for 
social security; in Britain that figure was 4 per cent; even including 
tax payments, the contributions made by the average British worker 
were considerably lower than those of his West German colleague.62 
Given the 'neo-liberal leanings' of the ruling political forces, how 
can this development towards a welfare state in Germany be explained? 
Out of a welter of political and structural factors I shall here list only 
the nine probably most significant: (1) the growing quota of employed 
persons63 automatically raised the number of insured and thus (2) 
increased the political weight of voters with an interest in state social 
benefits, which (3), given a parliamentary democracy, competing 
political parties and periodic general elections, gained a relatively strong 
influence. (Major reforms were, in the main, passed just prior to general 
elections.) (4) The demographic development (an increase in the ratio 
of old people) automatically raised the costs of the social security 
system.64 (5) Specific post-war problems necessitated increased state 
intervention. (6) Continuing economic growth left more scope for 
distribution, so that an increase in social demands could be met out of 
current revenues. (7) Against the background of crises and catastrophes 
in German history, groups within the governing party considered 
active social policies a pre-condition for the internal stabilisation 
of the new liberal-democratic state. (8) In view of the division of 
Germany, this motive of stabilisation gained an added dimension 
through a sense of threat from the Communists: West Germany's 
social policy aimed in no small measure at making the population 
'socially resistant' and thereby 'to engender greater immunity against 
Communist influence and infiltration'. 6 5 Conversely, the Adenauer 
governments were intent on creating a social order in West Germany 
which would be attractive also to the East Germans, in order to 
counteract the solidification of the German partition. (9) A further 
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factor was that one wing of the leading government party belonged 
to the open-minded social traditions of the Christian social movement, 
while the decidedly neo-liberal wing was being reconciled by the non-
levelling structure of the German social security system. 
Some Unresolved Problems at the End of the Adenauer Era 
Probably the greatest success in the field of social policy of the 
Adenauer era was to secure the economic status of those who either 
temporarily (through sickness) or permanently (through old age) 
have ceased to be wage-earners. Measured against the awareness of 
problems and the catalogue of demands contained in the Beveridge 
Report, a number of important questions remained unresolved. Here 
I can cite only a few. 
(1) Expansion and effective co-ordination of benefits in kind, i.e. 
especially of social services. This task - which the Beveridge 
Plan had particularly emphasised - gained urgency to the 
degree that in the area of (monetary) security of income, 
social insurance was attaining its major objectives. Yet in 
the early 1970s it could still be said that 'the economic-
monetary bias of West German social policy contrasts with a 
general reluctance to provide services.'66 
(2) The development of a comprehensive social budget, oriented 
in the medium term on the extent, structure and probable 
development of social expenditure, and a clarification of its 
position within the overall framework of national accounts. 
The first attempt to arrive at this type of social budget was 
presented by the Federal government in 1969. 6 7 
(3) The codificaton of social legislation, gathering all social security 
provisions in a lucid, non-contradictory and complete code of 
law. The first part of a — still unfinished — code of social law 
came into force in 1976. 
(4) The question of pensions for non-earning housewives is at 
present at the centre of social policy debates in Germany. 
Virtually all participants are in favour of giving housewives 
independent security, instead of the current system which 
grants them only an indirect share in pension provisions, with 
less rights than their husbands.68 A concept has thus become 
topical once more which Beveridge had expressed in his demand 
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to treat women 'not as persons dependent on their husbands, 
but as partners' and to grant 'housewives independent insur­
ance status'.69 
For the instances cited here, the Beveridge Plan had provided some 
important initial ground work. Even i f some of the proposals no longer 
seem to provide entirely convincing solutions, hindsight nevertheless 
shows how momentous the new ideas generated by his plan have proved 
to be, for 'in the context of economic policy and an integrated theory 
of social needs, he showed a comprehensiveness that at the time had 
not been achieved in any other country'. 7 0 
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